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Abstract 
   The major problem of sustainability for most charities and philanthropic 
organisations is that they do not produce commercially viable outputs. The problem is 
highlighted by the fact that many not-for-profit organisations that do produce a 
saleable commodity, such as sports clubs, stock exchanges, insurance clubs and 
community banks frequently convert to for-profit organisations. Those that cannot or 
do not produce saleable commodities rely on donations from individuals, 
organisations and governments, for which they cannot usually offer any direct 
exchange of goods. Nevertheless these organisations provide vital services such as 
family welfare services and counselling, and emergency relief. They provide both 
public and private goods that caring societies desire, but these providing 
organisations have enormous difficulties is sustaining themselves.  
Charitable organisations carry out fundraising as a source of income. They 
operate in an increasingly competitive context where being a sustainable 
organisation has emerged as a critical issue. However, sustainability studies are 
virtually absent in the not-for-profit (excluding government) sector. It is believed that 
this is either the first or one of the first studies of economic sustainability of charitable 
organisations. It uses organisational data.  
For sustained donations these organisations rely on either some continuing 
form of self-interest on the part of donors or, if the self-interest motive is not 
available, some form of altruism. This problem is further compounded by the 
existence of competition for funds among charities operating in the same areas e.g. 
disaster and emergency relief, medicine and family welfare. It is argued in this paper 
using data from Australia that competition for funds diminishes sustainability.   
Non-profit organisations compete for donations in two ways. The first is by an 
efficient and effective service to the charitable organisations‘ recipients. This is often 
but not always directly observable by the donating public. The second form of 
competition is the public provision of information, services and marketing and 
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promotion to potential donor. Competition in this form, of course, raises the 
fundraising expenditures of charitable organisations.  
 
Keywords: Non-profit; Organisational sustainability;  Public Goods in Private Goods; 
Provision; Replacing Government; Volunteers. 
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1. Introduction 
The major problem of sustainability for most charities and philanthropic 
organisations is that they do not produce commercial outputs. The problem is 
highlighted by the fact that many not-for-profit organisations that do produce a 
saleable commodity such as sports clubs, stock exchanges, insurance clubs and 
community banks frequently convert to for-profit organisations. Those that cannot or 
do not produce saleable commodities rely on donations from individuals, 
organisations and governments, for which they cannot usually offer any direct 
exchange of goods. Nevertheless these organisations provide vital services such as 
disaster, family welfare and counselling, and emergency relief. They provide both 
public and private goods that caring societies desire but the organisations have 
enormous difficulties is sustaining themselves.  
Charitable organisations carry out fundraising as a source of income. They 
operate in an increasingly competitive context where being sustainable organisation 
has emerged as a critical issue. However, sustainability studies are virtually absent in 
the not-for-profit (excluding governments) sector. It is believed that this is either the 
first or one of the first studies of economic sustainability of charitable organisations. It 
uses organisational data. 
For sustained donations these organisations rely on either some continuing 
form of self-interest on the part of donors or, if the self-interest motive is not 
available, some form of altruism. This problem is further compounded by the 
existence of competition for funds among charities operating in the same areas e.g. 
disaster and emergency relief, medicine and family welfare. It is argued in this paper 
using data from Australia that competition for funds diminishes sustainability.   
This article, therefore, attempts to investigate research questions of effective 
fundraising activities have effect on competition of charitable organisations for 
donation, using the data from samples of Australian charitable organisations on the 
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competition model, how competition has impact on total donation through level of 
fundraising, level of other costs and other organisational factors.  
Charitable organisations are forced to become more independent of the 
Government as a result of government policy (Keen 1999; Hatsutani 2001; Ouchi 
2004) and an increasing number of charitable organisations are seeking donation 
from a broader section of the community (Salamon, Hems et al. 2000). 
Despite most contributions from individuals go to charitable organisations 
instead of for-profit organisations or government agencies (Rose-Ackerman 1982). 
Given the difficulty of monitoring work related to social welfare, donors may fear that 
for-profit firms will convert contributions into compensation for the owners. Although 
managers of charitable organisations are able to misuse funds, using a charitable 
organisation for private gain is illegal (Hansmann 1980). Therefore if people are 
willing to make such a comparison, charitable organisations are positions to compete 
for such altruistic contribution better than for-profits. People trust that charitable 
organisations have particular beliefs about the best way to provide more diverse 
services than is possible in the public sector (Rose-Ackerman 1997). The question 
may then be one of understanding how charitable organisations operate with respect 
to each other. In particular how they compete for donations. Pleasure charitable 
organisations feel for an idea of supporting refined in a service-providing or advocacy 
organisation. 
In view of both the growth and the significance of the charity sector, there is a 
need of understand the role of charitable organisation to survive in the competition 
market  (Parsons 2003). There seems a potential for empirical models of the 
competition between charitable organisations for donations.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Charitable organisations will likely compete with each other for donation. 
Recent research has found that market competition for donations is a primary 
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instrument for charitable organisation to be more disciplined organisation (Glaeser 
2003; Thornton and Belski 2009). Yet, it is not clear how donor markets might 
influence by variation in organisational efficiency. The effects of competition among 
charitable organisations may emphasise their ability to contract on the use of 
donation (Castaneda, Garen et al. 2007). A potential avenue of inquiry is the interest 
on financial information shown by potential donors as a tool of selection of most 
effective and trustworthy charitable organisation for donations (Seidman 1998). In 
addition, a charity‘s fundraising spending which is the flow of additions to total 
donations or replacements for adequate service goods is important because it 
determines the future value of the charitable organisation and thus affects future 
services and aggregate to recipients.  
Employing the modified theory of oligopolistic competition markets, this study 
attempts to construct theoretically and empirical modelling for answering research 
questions using samples of charitable organisations in Australia.  
People may donate because they have deep concern for others in what is 
predominantly an altruistic act or they may expect other benefits. These can include 
receiving recognition from others in a more self-centred motivation (Gordon and 
Khumawala 1999; Andreoni and Petrie 2004). Thus altruistic donors are described as 
focused on the goal of benefiting others, while status seeking donors are interested 
in receiving a higher social recognition (Kumru and Vesterlund 2005). Romano and 
Yildirim (2001) find the observability of donation participants in prestigious charities is 
highly correlated with the total donations received by those charities: for instance the 
announcement of a wealthy donor's substantial donation may influence individual 
smaller donors to contribute (Andreoni 1998). 
Donors value the services of charitable organisations and so wish to provide 
donations. But in reality, charitable organisations usually have preferences about 
administrative expenses and program services. If we assume an organisation is a 
purely altruistic charitable organisation, it will only be interested in maximising the 
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utility of recipient (Roberts 1984). However, although most charitable organisations 
may be motivated by altruism, charitable organisations consist of incompletely 
altruistic individuals (members, employees and donors). Each charitable organisation 
has preferences over administrative expenses and program services. However, if the 
charitable organisation is an altruistic organisation, donations from private donors will 
directly go to program services, to recipients.  
Of course charitable organisations are not monopoly providers. Which form of 
competition dominates determines how the competition affects the quality and 
quantity of program delivery to recipients. The maximising of the provision of program 
goods and services to recipients is crucial in this regard. Maximising the net value of 
the program goods and services enables the charitable organisation to credibly lower 
its cost of expenditure, thereby attracting donors. In the absence of this ability, 
competition occurs only in the form of fundraising spending, which does not improve 
the provision of the good or service. It is this better situation that is assumed in the 
absence of cost of delivery of service data.  
We consider charitable organisations in a market with N organisations. We 
assume the number and size of charitable organisations serves as the index of the 
degree of competition, and as the number of charitable organisations increases, the 
market is considered more competitive. We also assume that each charitable 
organisation produces a service to recipients (P) which is valued by potential donors. 
Thus, the charitable organisations compete for donations via (i) fundraising 
expenditures and (ii) the level of donations going to recipients. Fundraising 
expenditures are assumed to either inform, induce or enhance the utility donors 
obtain from the output of the charitable organisation. Of course, increased 
fundraising expenditures reduce the resources available for program services so a 
balancing calculation has to be made by the organisation.  
Consider a charitable organisation that receives donations from donors. The 
donations are used to cover expenditures on program services (PE), administration 
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costs (AC), fundraising expenditure (F), and other expenditures (OE). Each 
charitable organisation operates under the non-distribution of surplus constraint as 
follows 
     PE + AC + F +OE = D                                                                                           (1) 
As indicated, donors derive utility from the services (Pi) of the charitable 
organisations. However, the utility derived from the services of a particular charitable 
organisation may increase with fundraising expenditures. This could occur for a 
number of reasons. For example, if fundraising expenditures enhance the services of 
the charitable organisation or provide other services to donors, then fundraising 
expenditures enter directly in the utility function of donors. If we treat fundraising 
expenditure mainly as being for the purpose of advertising in this thesis, providing 
information about the existence and nature of the organisation, then fundraising 
expenditures do not enter directly into the utility function of donors. It is assumed that 
the services provided to recipients are identical for all charitable organisations in a 
given group. 
Donors derive utility from the quantity of their donations (Andreoni 1989), but 
can nonetheless choose the most efficient charitable organisations if they value the 
recipients. Here, we model the interaction of the charitable organisations their 
competitors, and donors as an extensive form of complete information, where 
Competition period: In a period, the charitable organisations choose the 
portion of donations (Fi) for fundraising expenditures to raise total donations.   
Donations period: Then, the donors observe the choices of the Charitable 
organisations and chooses an allocation of donations (D1,...,DN). 
Ratio of competitors: Assuming CO‘s fundraising activities/expenditure effect 
on donations, then its donations may be affected by competitors‘ fundraising 
activities/expenditures or the fraction of its fundraising expenditures to total 
competitors‘ fundraising expenditures.  
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Relative size effect: Charitable organisations‘ size/age are considered as a 
stock of quality of charitable organisations.  
Grouping: Charitable organisations compete with similar service providers of 
charitable organisations, or charitable organisations in the same location area 
(grouping allocation).  
As an example, consider two charities that operate in a duopolistic market. 
Assume that they might compete (noncooperative) or cooperate (cooperative) in the 
market place. As a monopoly a charitable organisation would choose a scale of 
dollars to maximise net funds received by recipients. In other words each charitable 
organisation is interested in increasing the utility of recipients, and their control over 
the utility of recipients is determined by the level of coordination among them 
(Dimand 1988). In other words, increases in total dollars to recipients affect oligopoly 
charities‘ utility favourably (Hochman and Rodgers 1969). This distinguishing 
characteristic of an oligopoly charitable organisation is that there are a few mutually 
interdependent charities that allocate either identical collection of donations to 
recipients or heterogeneous collection to recipients. Consider two charities 
competing for donations as well as each output to recipients;  
         (Ri , Rj), and Ri = F(Rj) and Rj = G(Ri).  
  
       where: i = charitable organisation i; j = competing charitable organisation j;  
                  R = output to recipient; F and G = function.  
 
The characteristics of these charities may be considered as either:  
(i) Cooperating with each other as a monopoly. The optimum of utility MaxUR is  
     where F is optimum F = Fi + Fj;  
(ii) Competing with each other, which shows two charities as duopoly organisations.  
We assume that charitable organisation i‘s total donation is affected by its 
own fundraising expenditures at competition period and donation period, when 
fundraising activities are taking place; and competitors‘ fundraising activities and ratio 
of competitors‘ fundraising expenditures on its own fundraising expenditure are also 
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influenced at the same time. However, as discussed above, the charitable 
organisation i‘s size (fixed assets), age, volunteers, administration costs, government 
grants and the relative effect of competitors‘ size on its own size may have an effect 
on the previous period. Consistent with previous studies, a log-log form of the model 
is used. This form of the model has generally stated as being better1 than the linear 
form of the model (Jacobs and Marudas 2009).  
The parameter estimates from testing a log-log model are interpreted as 
elasticities; i.e., the percentage (not absolute) change in the dependent variable 
associated with a one percent change in the independent variable. The underlying 
assumption is that the elasticities, rather than the absolute effects, are constant 
across the range of data. The initial empirical model tested was Model 1: 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1    
          + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + ε                                                
(1) 
 
where: i indicates the charitable organisation;  
j indicates competing charitable organisations;  
t indicates the year;  
D is donations;  
F is fundraising expenditures;  
Fi /F is the ratio of Fi to F;  
A is fixed assets (a proxy of organisational size);  
Ai /A is the ratio of Ai to A;  
V is the number of volunteers;  
Age is organisational age; and  
ε is the error term. 
 
The dependent variable is total private donations. The major independent 
variables of interest is F, fundraising expenditures is included because presumably 
the more a charitable organisation spends on fundraising activities, the objective of 
which is to raise additional donations, the more donations the charitable organisation 
should receive. 
                                                   
1 The evidence of ‗better‘ was based on US data because most of the previous studies used US data.   
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Another independent variable of major interest is A, fixed assets at the end of 
the year. This is included because it can be a measure of organisational wealth and 
that the wealthier an organisation is the less it needs additional donations, 
suggesting a negative relation between years of assets and donations (Marudas and 
Jacobs 2004).  
Figure 1 presents the summary of research questions, testable hypotheses 
and empirical models. To answer Direct Research Question 1, hypothesis 1 is tested 
using empirical Models 1, 2, 3 and 4. To answer Direct Research Question 2, further 
sub questions are asked. To answer Direct Research Question 2-1, hypotheses 2 
and 3 are tested using empirical Models 1, 2, 3 and 4. To answer Direct Research 
Question 2-2, hypotheses 4, 5 and 7 are tested using empirical Models 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
To answer Direct Research Question 2-3, hypotheses 6, 8 and 9 are tested using 
empirical Models 1, 2, 3 and 4. Therefore, all models 1 to 4 including all equations 1-
24 are a family of empirical models and they are used to answer the research 
questions of this study.  
 
Figure 1: Research topics, questions, hypotheses and models of the research 
 
 
Research Topic 
Fundraising activities of charitable organisations (COs) in Australia 
(Including competition for donation between charitable organisations) 
 
 
DRQ2-1: How does 
competition between 
COs affect effectiveness 
of fundraising? 
 
DRQ2-2: What 
characteristics of COs 
affect fundraising? 
 
DRQ2-3: What other 
factors of COs affect 
fundraising?  
 
H1  
H0: Fi = 0 
H1: Fi > 0 
 
H4 & H7                  H5 
H0: Ai = 0 
H1: Ai > 0  
H0: Agei = 0 
H1: Agei > 0  
 
H0: Ai /A = 0 
(Ai/Aj = 0)  
H1: Ai /A> 0  
(Ai /Aj> 0) 
       
 
H6                    H8 &H9 
H0: Vi = 0 
H1: Vi > 0  
 
H0: Gi = 0 
H1: Gi > 0  
H0: ACi =0 
H1: ACj >0 
 
Research Questions 
Indirect Research Question (IRQ): 
Are COs altruistic? 
DRQ 1: (How) Do COs 
maximise private donations 
(non-government grants)?  
 
DRQ 2: Does competition 
between COs for donations 
affect donor behaviour and 
donations?  
H1&H2                  H3 
H0: Fi = 0 
H1: Fi >0  
H0:Fj = 0 
H1: Fj < 0 
 
H0: Fi /F= 0       
(Fi /Fj =0) 
H1: Fi /F> 0  
(Fi /Fj >0) 
 
Direct Research Question (DRQ): 
What determines the level of 
fundraising expenditures and the 
level of donations raised by COs?  
where: M = ordinary least squared (OLS) model (M1-4) for hypotheses (H) 1-9 testing; 
i = charitable organisation (CO) i;  j =competitor CO to CO i;  
F = fundraising expenditures; A = fixed assets (a proxy of size);  
Age = number of years since the CO i was formally created (operational age);  
V = number of persons per year working as volunteers;  
G = government subsidies/grants; AC = Administrative costs 
 
 
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4 
 
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4 
 
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4 
 
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4 
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3. Methodology   
To find the competition among not-for-profit organisations for funds 
diminishes sustainability, we employ created modification of Model 1. In the following 
section, the formation of each modified model is explained.   
 
3.1 Creating a family of models  
All of the models in this section are modifications of Model 1. As shown in 
Figure 2, a family of empirical models, in the first row there are four models, Model 1 
to 4. Models 2 to 4 are modified from Model 1. For example, a modification for Model 
2 is created by including an additional variable, Government Grants (G), on Model 1. 
A modification for Model 3 is created by including an additional variable, 
Administrative Costs (AC), on Model 1. Model 4 is created by excluding a variable, 
Organisational Age (Age) and including an additional variable, Government Grants 
(G).  
Each Model 1 to 4 is divided into three, major family or two of minor family 
models. Major family models, 1 to 4 are consisted of combination of lagged and 
unlagged independent variables, whereas minor family models, 1 to 4 formed by 
either lagged independent variables only (Minor Family 1) or unlagged independent 
variables only (Minor Family 2). Major family models are labelled as Models 1 to 4. 
Minor family models employ either lagged independent variables only (minor family 
1) or unlagged independent variables only (minor family 2, labelled as U). Models of 
minor family 1 are labelled L for sub-division of Models 1 to 4 (i.e. Model 1_L), 
whereas models of minor family 2 are labelled U for sub-division of Models 1 to 4 (i.e. 
Model 1_U). 
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Figure 2: A family of empirical models 
 
 
Note: M1, M2, M3, M4 are family models. Major family models use combining lagged and unlagged values for independent variables [fundraising 
expenditure related variables are unlagged (lnFi, lnFj and lnFi/lnF) and others are lagged]. Minor family models are either all lagged (L) (minor 
family 1) or unlagged (U) (minor family 2) for independent variables. The ratios to competitors are employed in two ways to compute competitors: 
1. all competitors, F (or A); or 2. competing charities J (Fj or Aj), computed from all competitors minus i, (Fj=F–Fi or Aj = A–Ai).  
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Note: M1, M2, M3, M4 are family models. M1 is basic model and M2, M3 and M4 are constructed from M1. M2 contains an additional variable to 
M1, Government Grants, G. M3 contains an additional variable, Administrative Costs, AC. M4 has an additional variable G, but not Age.  
Empirical models  
M1, M2, M3, M4 
Major Family 
Lagged and unlagged  
 
Minor Family 1 
Lagged 
Minor Family 2 
Unlagged 
3. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors 
lnFi/ΣlnF 
4. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors 
lnFi /ΣlnFj 
 
1. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors 
lnFi/ΣlnF 
2. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors 
lnFi /ΣlnFj 
 
5. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors’ 
lnFi/ΣlnF 
 
6. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors 
lnFi /ΣlnFj 
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Furthermore, major or minor models are each divided into two groups in 
relation to calculation of the ratio, either using denominator as total value of 
competing charities or the value of competing charities j. Figure 2 presents a family 
of empirical models, in the third row there are the first and the second box (1 or 2. 3 
or 4, 5 or 6). Each of the first family models in the first boxes (1, 3 or 5) in the third 
row use the total value of all competing charities as the denominator in the 
calculation of the ratios (i.e., ln Fi / Σln F or ln Ai / Σln A), whereas the second family 
models in the second boxes (2, 4 and 6) use the value of competing charity j as the 
denominator in the calculation of the ratios (i.e., ln Fi / Σln Fj or ln Ai / Σln Aj). The 
latter models are labelled j as an addition of sub-modified Models 1 to 4 (i.e., Model 
1_J or Model 1_LJ or Model 1_UJ). The amounts of competing charities j are 
calculated from the total value of competing charities minus the amount of charity i 
(ΣlnFj = ΣlnF–lnFi and ΣlnAj = ΣlnA–lnAi).  
Therefore, Model 1 is consistent with Equations 1 to 6, Model 2 with 
Equations 7 to 12, Model 3 with Equations 13 to 18, and Model 4 is consistent with 
19 to 24.  
 
4. Data and Sample selection  
This study uses, as its sample data, the financial and non-financial variables 
obtained from the annual reports of 100 charitable organisations, of which 50 operate 
in from Australia for the four financial years from 2001 to 2008.  
The choice of the eight year time period provides scope for the inclusion of 
data that is both representative and avoids distortion. With respect to the eight year 
time period selected from 2001, the Australian Government has required Australian 
charitable organisations to disclose their annual reports since 2001. This allows this 
study to employ full data sets from 2001.  
The Australian charitable organisations are selected from the Business 
Review Weekly‘s (BRW) ―Top 200 Charitable Organisations‖ list, as at July 2006 
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(BRW 2006). Annual reports for the 50 Australian charitable organisations are 
obtained via each organisation‘s website or, alternatively, following a written request 
to the organisations. The study excludes government formed non-profit 
organisations, political party organisations, universities, hospitals, social clubs and 
groups, because the operations of these organisations are chiefly dependent on 
government budgets or club members‘ fees. Such individual donations as occur are 
not likely to influence these organisations‘ operations. On the other hand, the 
charities‘ operations are partly dependent on individual donations and individual 
donors‘ determinants for donations and, hence, are more likely to influence charitable 
operations.  
The sample data and variables were defined in the previous section. 
Correlation coefficients tend to be less reliable when estimated from small samples 
(Tabachnick and Fidell 2001); therefore, it is important to have a sample size large 
enough to obtain a reliable estimation for the correlation coefficients.  
First, descriptive statistics on data are tested, followed by a correlation matrix 
which discloses the general factorability (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Second, the 
data are checked for normal distribution. If the variables are normally distributed, the 
solution is enhanced (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). However, the logarithm 
transformation for variables is to reduce the impact of outliers but it is necessary to 
check whether the variable gives a normal or near-normal distribution after the 
transformation of the data (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001,p.81). Thirdly, the outliers in 
the variables act as an influence on the factor solution. Univariate outliers are 
examined using the scatter plot and the histogram graphically, or testing from a 
standardised score of z scores on one or more variables, to see if it is in excess of 
3.29 (p<0.001, two-tailed test) (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). If outliers are detected, 
the data is eliminated after checking the accuracy of the data entry. In addition, the 
Mahalanobis Distance (MD) measurement is used to determine the outliers (Gujarati 
1995).  
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Finally, heteroscedasticity is tested using the ―Newy West test‖. In regression 
analysis, the variance of the dependent variable is assumed to be the equal variance 
across the data (homogeneity of variance) (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). The results 
of the ―White test‖ are evaluated for the null hypothesis of heteroscedasticity in the 
residuals with F-statistic in p-value. This ‗Newy West test‘ also allows the results of 
heteroscedasticity to be adjusted using the weighted least squares (Norusis 1993). 
 
4.1  Dependent and Independent Variables  
OLS regression analyses are conducted using the natural logarithm on total 
donations as the dependent variable (lnDit). ―Donations‖ are used as the dependent 
variable for the following reasons: Donations are more commonly used in studies of 
charitable organisations (Trussel and Parsons 2004); Donations are far more 
prevalent than government funding. ―Government funding‖ indicates that the 
contributor is a government entity rather than an individual, foundation or corporation 
(cf. Parsons 2003). Donations include only monetary contributions and do not include 
gifts of goods, because gifts of goods are not reported by most charity organisations 
(Piliavin and Charng 1990).  
Based upon theoretical and empirical modelling, the following variables are 
included as independent variables in the models and they are all transformed to a 
logarithm and are employed in the previous studies. Fundraising expenditures (F) 
(Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986; Gordon and Khumawala 1999; Tinkelman 2004); 
Administration Costs (AC) (Castaneda, Garen et al. 2007); Fixed Assets (A) (Rose-
Ackerman 1996; Tinkelman 1999; 2002); Organisational age (Age) ((Weisbrod and 
Dominguez 1986; Posnett and Sandler 1989; Tinkelman 1999; Khanna and Sandler 
2000; Parsons and Trussel 2003; 2008);The number of volunteers (V): (Gidron 1983; 
Smith 1983; Unger 1991; Callen 1994; Bekkers and Graaf 2005; Gittell and Tebaldi 
2006); and Government grants (G): Charitable organisations compete for receiving 
government subsidies (Marcuello and Salas 2001). Some previous studies find that 
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government grants encourage private donors to donate more (Warr 1982; Roberts 
1984; Kingma 1989; Andreoni 1990; Payne 1998; Khanna and Sandler 2000) and 
others have found that government subsidies discourage private giving (Warr 1982; 
Roberts 1984; Kingma 1989; Payne 1998), or that any increased government 
assistance can partially reduce private donations. (Schokkaert and Ootegem 1998).  
Furthermore, the dependent variable is total donations (D) and this is reported 
in the first level (raw data) and in natural log form (lnD). A number of the independent 
variables are presented in thousands of dollars including fundraising expenditures (Fi 
and Fj), fixed assets (Ai), government grants (G), administrative costs (AC) and the 
number of volunteers (V).  
One major difference between the present study and the most similar of 
previous studies (Posnett and Sandler 1989; Castaneda, Garen et al. 2007) is that 
they employed the fundraising competition index variables and the annected 
aggregation of group in charity types. Such aggregation would be fatal to the present 
study, since it would render meaningless the competition variables, which should 
vary between like charity groups. The competition variables are competitors 
fundraising expenditure, Fj, and the ratio of fundraising expenditures to all 
competitors, Fi/F or Fi/Fj  and ratio of organisational size to all competitors‘ size. The 
difference between Fi/F and Fi/Fj, or Ai/A and Ai/Aj is whether the denominator value 
includes the value of the charitable organisation in the former (Fi/F and Ai/A) or 
excludes it in the latter (Fi/Fj and Ai/A). These values are not different form each 
other when the group is large, but when the group is small, their differences would be 
large and so would affect results. The reason for using different denominators is to 
determine whether the empirical results are sensitive to the formulation used.  
A further difference lies on large standard deviations in variables of samples. 
Most of the raw variables are very different between charitable organisations and 
there are very large variations between samples at the raw level. This indicates 
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outliers requiring logarithmic transformation of data for OLS estimation. Table 
summarises research variables and summary definitions 
 
Table 1: Research variables and summary definitions 
Variables Definitions 
lnDi The natural logarithm of private donations (current dollars) to 
charitable organisation (CO) i  
 
lnFi The natural logarithm of fundraising expenditures of COi 
lnFj The natural logarithm of fundraising expenditures of COi‘s competitor 
COj, (Total fundraising expenditures in a group (F) – Fi). This value 
will vary between groups. 
lnFi/∑lnF The natural logarithm of ratio Fi to all competitors‘ F. This value will 
vary between groups.  
lnFi/lnFj The natural logarithm of ratio Fi to competitors‘ Fj, (alternative ratio to  
lnFi /∑lnF). This value will vary between groups. 
  
lnAi The natural logarithm of fixed assets of COi; used a proxy for the size 
and wealth of CO. 
lnAi/∑lnA The natural logarithm of ratio Ai to all competitors ‗A. This value will 
vary between groups. 
lnAi/lnAj The natural logarithm of ratio Ai to competitor‘s Aj (alternative ratio to 
lnAi/∑lnA). This value will vary between groups. 
 
lnVi The natural logarithm of number of persons per year working as 
volunteers for COi. 
 
lnAgei The natural logarithm of number of years since the COi was formally 
created (operational age). 
 
lnGi The natural logarithm of government subsidies/grants to COi.  
 
lnACi The natural logarithm of administrative costs of COi. 
 
NOTE: All variables are represented in number or monetary value for a financial 
year.   
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5.  The results of a family of empirical modelling for Australian data 
Competitive models in the OLS regression with allocation of charitable 
organisations into similar industry group. The purpose of the grouping is to allow 
competition effects from competitor charities, different organisations with similar 
missions and objectives. A sample of charitable organisations in Australia is grouped 
into eight groups. These are: 
1. All — all organisations combined (352 observations)  
2. Welfare (119) 
3. Humanitarian (42) 
4. Global (35) 
5 Disability (84) 
6. Animal (21) 
7. Science (and Culture) (28)  
8. Rural (49)  
 
5.1 Major family of competition model 1 
Model 1 combines lagged and unlagged independent variables as 
determining donation. As discussed earlier, fundraising expenditures are the cost for 
fundraising activities for raising donations, therefore fundraising expenditures are 
expected to have a direct effect on current collection of donations. Other independent 
variables take longer to have an effect on the current donation, so Model 1 employs 
fundraising expenditures of the current year whereas other independent variables 
use information from the previous year.   
The results of the parameter estimation of a log-log model are interpretable 
as elasticity; i.e. the percentage change in the dependent variable correlated with a 
one percent change in the independent variable. The underlying assumption is that 
the elasticities, rather than the absolute effects, are constant across the range of 
data. Estimation results for each industry group and the coefficients of independent 
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variables for each industry group are presented. These results indicate several 
points: (1) the sample of Australian charitable organisations is successfully allocated 
in an appropriate group; (2) the competition models fit well with the groups of 
charitable organisations; (3) most variables in the competition models one are related 
to total donations; and (4) charitable organisations compete within the same group of 
organisation. The structural form of the regression analysis indicates a Cournot type 
model of oligopolistic competition.  
In Table 2, lnFi is shown as positive elasticity in most of the groups, as 
expected, except Rural. Thus, the coefficients of fundraising expenditures in all 
groups are the range between -0.010 and 10.016. lnFi shows significantly positive 
correlation in the Global, Disability and Science groups. As developed in Chapter 5, 
hypothesis one is tested as follows: H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in most groups; All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, Disability, Animal and 
Science groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the Rural group.  
The coefficients in lnFj are significantly negative in the Global, Disability and 
Science groups as expected, while they are positive and significant in the 
Humanitarian industry and positive but insignificant in the All, Welfare, Animal and 
Rural groups, and the ranges are between -6.094 and 0.607. Hypothesis 2 is tested 
as: H0: Fj  0 and H1: Fj < 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in Global, Disability and 
Science groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the All, Welfare, 
Humanitarian, Animal and Rural groups.  
The regression coefficient on the ratio of lnFi to all competitors, lnFi/∑lnF, 
garnered mixed results, with significantly positive elasticities in All, but insignificant 
but positive elasticities in the Humanitarian and Animal. Those of the Global, 
Disability and Science groups are negative but significant, but show negative and 
insignificant elasticities in the Welfare and Rural groups. Hypothesis 3 is tested as: 
Hypothesis 3: H0: Fi /F  0 and H1: Fi /F > 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected the All, 
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Humanitarian and Animal groups, whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the 
Welfare, Global, Disability, Science and Rural groups.   
These results indicate that fundraising expenditures have a positive impact on 
the level of total donation in the most of groups except in the Rural group. The 
competitors fundraising activities impact on donors in the Global, Disability and 
Science groups to donate competitors by reducing donation to the original 
organisations. However, they increased the level of donations in the Welfare, 
Humanitarian, Animal and Rural groups. In other words, competitors‘ fundraising 
activities may influence donors to increase overall support for their own preferred 
charitable causes especially in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Animal and Rural groups.  
The coefficient on size (lnAi) is shown to be positive and significant in the 
Disability group, and insignificant but positive in the Welfare, Animal, and Science 
groups as expected, whereas the coefficients in the All, Humanitarian, Global and 
Rural groups are obtained otherwise. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai 
> 0: The Null Hypothesis is rejected in the Welfare, Disability, Animal, and Science 
groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global and 
Rural groups.  
The coefficient on the ratio of size to competitors‘ size is positive in the All, 
Humanitarian, Global, Science and Rural groups, while those in the Disability and 
Animal groups is negative but significant, and negative and insignificant in the 
Welfare group. Hypothesis 5 is tested as: H0: Ai /A  0 and H1: Ai /A > 0. The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global, Science and Rural groups, 
whereas the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the Welfare, Disability and Animal 
groups. The above results indicate that the size of charitable organisations has a 
positive impact and encourages donors to donate more in the groups of Welfare, 
Animal and Disability.  
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The coefficients on Volunteers (lnV) are either significantly positive or positive 
in all groups, significantly positive in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability and 
Rural groups, and positive but insignificant in the Animal group. Volunteers seem to 
impact and increase the level of total donations in all groups. Hypothesis 6 is tested 
as: H0: Vi  0 and H1: Vi > 0. Thus, the Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, 
Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability, Rural groups of charitable organisations. 
Conversely the Null Hypothesis is rejected in the Animal group.  
The coefficient on Age (lnAge) also indicated mixed results. It was positive 
and significant in the Disability and positive but insignificant in the All and Science 
groups, whereas those of the Humanitarian, Global and Rural groups are negative 
but significant, and negative and insignificant in the Welfare and Animal groups. 
Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. The Null hypothesis is 
rejected in the All, Disability and, Science and Culture groups of charitable 
orgnisaitons, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the Humanitarian, Global, 
Welfare, Animal and Rural groups of charitable organisations. 
Lastly the coefficients on constant show significantly positive in the Global, 
Disability, Animal and Rural groups, whereas those in the All, Welfare and 
Humanitarian groups are otherwise. 
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Table 2: OLS Estimation for a Family of Model 1 
 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + e 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -2.709 -1.266 -4.026 32.919*** 64.777*** 30.224*** 31.845 13.650** 
 (5.658) (2.924) (4.365) (9.789) (16.962) (7.349) (25.291) (6.700) 
lnFi    (β1) 0.116 0.351 0.103 7.502*** 10.016*** 0.020 4.808** -0.010 
 (1.380) (0.356) (0.081) (2.587) (3.044) (0.575) (2.639) (0.576) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.325 0.024 0.607** -2.137*** -6.094*** 0.643 -4.024** 0.027 
 (0.447) (0.228) (0.359) (0.773) (1.516) (0.499) (2.043) (0.489) 
lnFi /ΣlnF (β3) 145.228 -9.597 7.171* -374.576*** -1305.326*** 4.376 -186.955** -6.179 
 (757.196) (64.776) (5.060) (143.195) (400.462) (17.699) (103.03) (55.186) 
lnAi t-1 (β4) -0.686 0.015 -0.484 -1.344 1.856** 0.178 0.387 -1.466* 
 (1.416) (0.183) (0.430) (1.573) (1.178) (0.291) (0.925) (1.064) 
lnAi t-1/ΣlnAt-1 (β5) 382.981 -18.724 82.331 73.543 -275.739** -39.811*** 1.364 92.648 
 (944.701) (41.424) (72.106) (95.283) (174.335) (13.181) (41.849) (105.94) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.679*** 1.116*** 0.771*** 0.245 0.373*** -2.488*** 0.307 1.018*** 
 (0.064) (0.113) (0.066) (0.252) (0.148) (0.859) (0.552) (0.123) 
lnAgei t-1   (β7) 0.143 -0.066 -0.227** -1.188*** 1.678*** -0.060 2.201 -1.099*** 
 (0.112) (0.122) (0.103) (0.294) (0.225) (0.345) (2.164) (0.278) 
R2 0.455 0.570 0.711 0.832 0.610 0.838 0.639 0.785 
Adjusted R2 0.442 0.543 0.684 0.789 0.574 0.751 0.512 0.740 
SE regression 1.319 1.003 0.734 0.521 1.034 0.298 1.117 0.663 
Observations 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 1 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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5.2 Summary of Results for Model 1 and its sub-families 
A family model of Model 1 consists of independent variables, including 
fundraising expenditures; competing charities‘ fundraising expenditures; the ratio of 
fundraising expenditures to the total of all competing charities‘ fundraising 
expenditures; fixed assets (as a proxy of established size); the ratio of fixed assets to 
the total of all competing charities‘ fixed assets; the number of volunteers and 
organisational age. A family model of Models is constructed through modifications of 
Model 1. Thus Equations 2 to 6 use either the total of all competing charities‘ values or 
competing charities j‘s values for the denominator in the calculation of the ratios of 
fundraising expenditures or fixed assets combination, or use lagged or unlagged 
independent variables only.  
The results of Model 1 family indicate that the effectiveness of fundraising 
activities of charitable organisations and the positive effect of volunteers on the level of 
total donations in most groups except Humanitarian, Animal and Rural. The competing 
charities‘ fundraising expenditures are consistently negative in the Global, Disability 
and Science groups as expected, whereas in other five groups have obtained positive 
correlation to total donations in some variations of Model 1. Similarly, the sign of the 
ratio of fundraising expenditures in the Global, Disability and Science groups are, not 
as expected, constantly shown as negative, while the signs of that in other five groups 
vary as in Model 1.   
The results of correlation between the size of organisation and total donations 
vary in sign, similarity to Model 1, except that the Animal group is positive. The ratio of 
organisational size to total of competing charities‘ size is expected to have a positive 
correlation to total donations. However, the results vary again as with Model 1. 
Similarly, signs of correlation between the ratio of fixed assets and total donations vary 
similarity to Model 1.   
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6.    Discussion and Conclusion  
 
6.1 Industry Groups 
The results showed that the more a charitable organisation spent on its 
fundraising expenditures (Fi), the more its total donations increased in the current year 
in the most of Australian charity groups except Animal industry. The results also 
indicated, as expected, that the more a competing organisation spends on competing 
organisational fundraising expenditures (Fj), less a charitable organisation raises total 
donations in Global, Disability and Science groups in the current year. Furthermore, 
when government grants were included as an additional explanatory variable in 
empirical models (Models 2 and 4), the competing organisation‘s Fundraising 
expenditures (Fj) also became negative effect on its total donations in Welfare and 
Rural groups in current year. The reasons for this are unclear in terms of donor and 
organisational behaviour. In addition, the ratio of fundraising expenditures to the 
competitors‘ fundraising expenditures in the current year had a positive effect on 
raising donations in the full sample of charitable organisations (All), Humanitarian, and 
Animal groups. These results indicated that a sample of each charitable organisation in 
similar service provider group carefully watches the major decisions of its rival and 
would often plan counterstrategies in Australia. For example, Red Cross Australia 
cancelled its annual door-knock appeal after the collection of large donations for the 
Victorian Bushfire in 2009.  
The level of volunteers (V) had a significant positive effect on donations in most 
of groups except Animal industry in the following year and Welfare and Rural groups 
show strongest at 1% of significance (1.018 and 1.116, respectively). This was 
because volunteers involved fundraising activities of the charity and also many of them 
can be expected to also donate. Because of volunteers have insight into how charitable 
organisations operate, donors might see as the longer or the more volunteers involved 
in the charitable organisations, the more they would trust the organisation.  
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Similar to the volunteers on donation, the organisational size and age also 
showed a positive affect on the total donations. Thus, organisational size (A) had a 
positive effect on donations in Welfare, Disability, Animal and Science groups in the 
following years (from 0.015 to 1.856), whereas organisational age has also a positive 
effect in All, Disability, Science and Rural industry(from 0.143 to 4.475).  
Government support (G) showed mixed results which was consistent with the 
previous studies (see Section 3.5.2). In five groups, All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Global, 
Animal and Rural groups, government grants crowded-in effect on total donations in 
the following year, whereas in Global, Disability and Science groups, it was crowding-
out donations.  
Administrative costs (AC) were negative effect on total donations in All, Global 
and Science groups in Australia and this result was consistent with the previous study 
which found that the more charitable organisations spent on administration, the less it 
received from donors using limited organisational data with very larger donations in US 
(Tinkelman and Mankaney 2007). However, in this thesis in five groups, Welfare, 
Humanitarian, Disability, Animal and Rural, it was positive on donations in the following 
year, these results might be affected by the size of donations.  
We also conducted for geographic geographical location grouping in 6 States, 
ACT, Victoria, New South Wales (NSW), Queensland (QLD), Western Australia (WA) 
and South Australia (SA). The number of observations is 16 in ACT, 143 in Victoria, 98 
in NSW, 28 in QLD, 28 in WA and 16 in SA. Some of groups showed similar signs with 
the results of the industry groups, while some not. Overall the empirical results are for 
more inconsistent. In the four states, Victoria, NSW, QLD and WA, Fundraising 
expenditures were positive on total donations and competitors‘ fundraising 
expenditures were negative on total donations but not in the state of ACT and SA. 
However, the number of volunteers showed similar results with the industry groups, it 
was significantly positive on total donations in most of the States except WA. The ratio 
of fundraising expenditure to competitors‘ fundraising expenditures were obtained 
mixed results as a positive in ACT and SA and a negative to total donations in Victoria, 
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NSW, QLD and WA. Organisational size and age were also obtained the mixed results. 
Organisational size was positive on total donation in Victoria, NSW and WA and 
negative in ACT, QLD and SA. Organisational age was positive on total donations in 
ACT, Victoria and WA, and negative in NSW, QLD and SA. Thus, government grants 
crowded-in ACT, Victoria, WA, while it crowded-out in NSW, QLD and SA. 
Administrative costs were positive on total donations in only two States, ACT and 
NSW, while four States in Victoria, QLD, WA and SA showed negative on total 
donations.  
Hence, overall the results with the geographic groups were much weaker than 
the industry group. This is to be expected if donors have an interest in the focus of 
organisations‘ charitable activities, rather than their location. This is especially so as 
many charities operate well away from their area of domicile.  
 
The significance of this article arises in several respects, incorporating 
charitable operational information effect on donation, focusing on competition among 
charities for donations, the role of altruism, discussion of theoretical and empirical 
modelling and providing the results of testing empirical models with sample of 
Australian charitable organisations. This study attempts to follow in the line of 
Castaneda, Garen and Thornton (2007). However, their study is to find the effects of 
competition for donors on the behaviour of charitable organisations and whether the 
information of the allocation of donation is contractible, the thesis concentrates the 
effectiveness of fundraising activities of charitable organisational competition for 
donations based on the Cournot quantity competition theory.   
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